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Northern Ireland is at a political and administrative cross-roads. Politically
the Good Friday Agreement has paved the way for devolved government,
and administratively the system of Direct Rule from Westminster will come
to an end. This article examines the major problems of accountability linked
to Direct Rule government and sets out a policy agenda for the new North-
ern Ireland Assembly.
THE POLITICAL CONTEXT
Northern Ireland has celebrated what has been billed as two major politi-
cal achievements—the Good Friday Agreement (10 April 1998) and its
subsequent endorsement in a “peace referendum” (22 May 1998). Both
have created a major momentum towards long-term stability and, after
many false dawns, what is widely acknowledged as a breakthrough in a
seemingly intractable problem. Neither achievement can be underesti-
mated, both in terms of the detail of the agreement and its electoral sup-
port expressed in Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic (71% and 94%
in referenda respectively). The momentous Good Friday Agreement was
the culmination of a process initiated by then Secretary of State Peter
Brooke in 1989 which repeatedly faltered but eventually led to multi-party
talks (initially excluding Sinn Féin) in June 1996. Little progress was made,
however, as delegates failed to agree on the issue of decommissioning of
weapons by paramilitary organizations and the talks did not advance into
issues of substance. Movement eventually became possible with the
United Kingdom general elections.
In May 1997 a new Labour Government was elected to Westminster
with a landslide victory, ending 18 years of Conservative rule. The size of
the Labour mandate (44% vote and 419 seats) nullified the political influ-
ence exerted by the Ulster Unionists over the previous administration. In
the same elections two prominent Sinn Féin leaders (Gerry Adams and
Martin McGuinness) were elected to Parliament. Both subsequently
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refused to swear an oath of allegiance to the Queen and could not there-
fore take their seats in the Commons. At the same time Fianna Fail, a party
seen to be more sympathetic to nationalists, was elected in the Republic of
Ireland. The size of the Sinn Féin vote (16.1%) and its new position as the
third largest political party in Northern Ireland [(behind the Ulster Union-
ists (UUP) and Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP)] demanded a
new response from the government. Under the new Labour Secretary of
State, Mo Mowlam, contacts between civil servants and Sinn Féin were
immediately authorized, ostensibly to clarify the new government’s posi-
tion, but in fact to negotiate with the party.
These negotiations, according to Sinn Féin, resulted in their demands
being met over four crucial issues: Sinn Féin would be admitted to
all-party talks on the same basis as other parties; those talks would be
completed within a fixed time frame; the government would not require
decommissioning of weapons before or during negotiations; and confi-
dence-building measures would be introduced, such as a relaxation in
security and the prisons regime. The result was the IRA cease-fire, effec-
tive from 20 July 1997. The renewal of the cease-fire was met with the
same degree of surprise as its collapse in February 1996. The terrorists had
“held the line” for 17 months (first cease-fire announced 31 August 1994)
before bombing London’s Docklands, killing 2 people and injuring many
others. Not surprisingly, this was greeted with considerable skepticism
and hostility by the UUP and Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) respec-
tively. The former described it as a tactical ploy aimed at getting Sinn Féin
into talks but reserving the right, should negotiations not go their way, to
re-engage in violence. DUP deputy leader Peter Robinson commented
that “all we have is a restoration of a phoney cease-fire.”
The talks resumed in June 1997, and returned to the issue of decommis-
sioning. Proposals were put forward by the two governments to progress
the issue alongside developments in the political talks. A consensus was
finally reached on 24 September 1997, permitting three strands of the sub-
stantive negotiation to be launched (strand 1: within Northern Ireland;
strand 2: within the island of Ireland; strand 3 between the British and
Irish governments). In January 1998, the two governments put forward a
set of “Propositions on Heads of Agreement,” outlining a possible settle-
ment. The Agreement was reached following intensive negotiations in the
multi-party talks at Stormont on 10 April 1998 (Good Friday).
The so-called “peace referenda” exposed several issues which have, in
the short term, the potential to wreck the Good Friday Agreement and, in
the long term, undermine political stability. Those campaigning against
the Agreement (DUP, UK Unionists and dissident Ulster Unionists) high-
lighted the early release of “political” prisoners without prior decommis-
sioning of terrorist weapons and the entry of Sinn Féin into the Executive
of the new Northern Ireland Assembly. The public parading of IRA and
Loyalist prisoners in a triumphalist display prior to the referenda was
seized upon by the “No” campaigners as proof of what the Agreement
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meant in practice and how the victims of violence had been forgotten.
Prime Minister Tony Blair intervened to assuage doubters that subse-
quent legislation would establish “objective and verifiable tests” as to
whether those involved had given up violence before they could take their
places in the Northern Ireland Assembly Executive or “political” prison-
ers could become eligible for accelerated release.
This changing and still volatile political milieu at the macro level,
however, overshadows the existence of a public administration system
characterized by serious problems of accountability. The priority status
accorded to constitutional, political and security matters in Northern
Ireland has allowed public policy to rest with unelected civil servants or
politicians who have no electoral constituency in Northern Ireland.
Essential public services such as health, education and housing operate
under the aegis of appointed boards and the major repository of power
is the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, a British cabinet minister,
within a system of direct rule from Westminster. One commentator
described the system thus:
Apart from what are little more than parish councils, Northern Ireland’s
all-embracing public sector is ruled either personally by British Ministers or
boards appointed by them. For 20 years no ruler of Northern Ireland has been
elected by its people. In no reputable sense of the term is Northern Ireland a
democracy. It is a colony. Its people react as colonial people normally react, by
turning to the political extremes (Jenkins 1993, 16).
It is perhaps ironic that the Northern Ireland civil rights campaign of 1968,
designed to address some of the inequities in public administration con-
tributed, in part, to a system of direct rule which has exacerbated, in a dif-
ferent form, problems of local accountable governance (Buckland 1981;
Whyte 1990). Throughout the period of direct rule, citizens of Northern
Ireland have acquiesced in a system of public service provision euphemis-
tically described as having a “democratic deficit” or being in a state of
“permanent impermanence” (Bloomfield 1997). While the abuse of powers
by erstwhile public bodies (particularly local authorities) in service deliv-
ery played a major part in the creation of the present system of administra-
tion in Northern Ireland, this has been compounded by government
policies in Great Britain, adopted in the Province, which have eroded local
democracy and contributed to the growth of quasi-autonomous
nongovernmental organizations (quangos) and other non-elected public
bodies.
Scotland and Wales can make similar “democratic deficit” claims. In
the former, devolutionists and nationalists assert that Scotland has a dis-
tinctive political agenda evidenced by a major decline in support for Con-
servatives. This, however, is rejected by observers who note:
If there are ideological divisions within Britain, these are not between Scotland
and England, but between north and south and these, in part, reflect differing
experiences of the Thatcher economic experience . . . If there is a “democratic
AT THE CROSSROADS OF POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 313
deficit,” it is a British one as much as a Scottish one, in the failure of government
to reflect public aspirations (Midwinter and McVicar 1996, 17).
Welsh devolutionists point to the large number of quangos and their
marked increase from 1979 onwards as evidence of a “democratic deficit.”
Here too these claims are rejected by regional experts who argue that dur-
ing the 1980s, policies such as privatization and education reform saw the
creation of new bodies “which in turn led to increased institutional differ-
entiation between Wales, Scotland and England, the upshot of which was
a more evident Welsh `state’ machinery, albeit one which did not alter
radically from its English counterpart” (Thomas 1996, 23; Hogwood 1995).
Northern Ireland has the strongest case for political reform based upon
“democratic deficit” arguments, yet such reforms in themselves go to the
heart of the national British/Irish identity question.
Set within this political context, this article examines three key areas.
First, it describes the existing arrangements for governance in Northern
Ireland which have led to serious problems of accountability. Second, it
looks at structures established under the new Northern Ireland Assembly
and the key policy issues of concern during the transition from direct rule
to devolved government. Finally, it outlines an agenda for policy and
administrative reform to address the worst excesses of a period of 26 years
of direct rule from Westminster. Local politicians, most of whom have not
held positions of executive power, are now faced with key policy deci-
sions which transcend traditional Orange/Green political cleavages—
circumstances they find both unusual and challenging. This is therefore
both a retrospective and prospective analysis of governance in Northern
Ireland at a turning point in its tumultuous political history.
THE GOVERNANCE OF NORTHERN IRELAND
Before providing an overview of the public administration system, some
consideration needs to be given to what exactly is meant by the term
“democratic deficit,” or lack of accountability, used to characterize North-
ern Ireland’s political and administrative framework of government.
Beetham suggests that “democracy belongs to the sphere of the political,
which is the sphere of collectively binding rules and policies, and of the
resolution of disagreement about what those policies should be”
(Beetham 1996, 29). The extent to which a system can be judged to be dem-
ocratic is based on two key democratic principles of popular control and
political equality. According to Beetham, how effective that control is, and
how equally distributed it is between individual citizens, and between
different groups of citizens, are key criteria for assessing how democratic
a system of representative government is. In these circumstances, democ-
racy is not direct popular control over decision-making, but control over
decision-makers who act on their behalf. This is particularly germane
when one considers the lack of control exercised by citizens of Northern
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Ireland over government ministers and civil servants. Making govern-
ment more democratic, Beetham argues, requires “popular authorisation
and accountability of public officials, and responsiveness and representa-
tiveness of decision-making bodies” (Beetham 1996, 31), the rationale for
devolving power back to an assembly in the province.
Public services in Northern Ireland operate through a complex
arrangement of central government departments, agencies, boards, trusts,
non-departmental public bodies and local councils. The system is a prod-
uct of the political turmoil from the late 1960s onwards and its conse-
quences for the machinery of government. The imposition of direct rule
under the Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act 1972, following
the resignation of the Northern Ireland government, led the United King-
dom Government to assume full and direct responsibility for its adminis-
tration under the newly created post of Secretary of State for Northern
Ireland (Ditch 1977; Birrell 1978). Direct rule, despite the passage of time,
remains a temporary phenomenon renewable annually by the United
Kingdom Parliament. As a consequence, it has incrementally embedded a
system of unaccountable public administration in Northern Ireland, con-
ceived initially as short-term, and inextricably linked the future develop-
ments of service delivery to progress on the constitutional/security fronts.
The Secretary of State, the Westminster cabinet minister responsible for
Northern Ireland, has direction and control of Northern Ireland depart-
ments for which she is accountable to Parliament, and introduces North-
ern Ireland legislation at Westminster, generally through orders in
council. Orders in council are a type of delegated legislation initiated
under a procedure which allows limited parliamentary time for debate
and permits no amendments. They must be accepted or rejected in their
entirety (Hadfield 1990). Working through the Northern Ireland Office
(NIO), the secretary of state, assisted by two ministers of state and two
parliamentary undersecretaries has, therefore, overall responsibility for
the government of Northern Ireland. She is directly involved with politi-
cal and constitutional matters, security policy and broad economic ques-
tions. The major functional areas of government, law and order, economic
development, education, health and social services and the environment
are shared among the other ministers, none of whom has electoral
accountability to the citizens of Northern Ireland.
Central Government
Six central government departments and the Northern Ireland Office
carry out the bulk of administrative services.1 In 1998–9 they will be
responsible for £8.5bn of public expenditure but their accountability
through political channels is, at best, tenuous and, at worst, scant in the
extreme. Although the “normal” mechanisms are in place whereby offi-
cials report to ministers and, as accounting officers, can face the wrath of
Parliamentary Select and Public Accounts Committees, these have proved
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limited in practice. Ministers have been too preoccupied with constitu-
tional and security matters to become involved in day-to-day oversight of
their departments and the appearance of civil servants at Westminster
parliamentary committees is infrequent. Even a series of recent high pro-
file cases (e.g. sale of the Belfast International Airport, Belfast Action
Teams, Castle Court shopping complex, Positively Belfast) which drew
scathing comments from the Public Accounts Committee on the probity of
public expenditure failed to do more than embarrass those civil servants
directly involved. Rather than confirming the means of calling civil ser-
vants to account, it has highlighted the nature of unaccountable govern-
ment in Northern Ireland. The proliferation of agencies is another
sub-unit of central government which gives rise to similar criticisms.
Agencies
Northern Ireland has, to a large extent, followed step-by-step the transfor-
mation towards new public management evident within the civil service
in Great Britain (Stewart and Walsh 1992). This has served only to accentu-
ate the worst features of the “democratic deficit.” The most obvious mani-
festation of the reforms in which to use the popularism, government was
“reinvented,” (Osborne and Gaebler 1992) is the separation of the pur-
chaser/provider role and the growth of contractual arrangements. The
creation of “Next Steps” agencies is an example here, whereby functions
are hived off to semi-autonomous units in government. The minister
determines the policy and financial framework within which the agency
operates, under the direction of a chief executive, but does not normally
become involved in its day-to-day management. The framework docu-
ment constitutes a contract for performance by agencies and establishes a
principal–agent relationship with the minister. There are now 24 agencies
operating in the Northern Ireland Civil Service accounting for 19,000 civil
servants, some 65% of the staff of central government departments and the
Northern Ireland Office. The Social Security Agency is a typical example
and the largest in Northern Ireland (employing around 4,200 staff). The
agency is subject to the overall direction and control of the Secretary of
State and the minister responsible, to whom oversight of social services as
a function is delegated. Members of Parliament and the general public are
encouraged by the minister to deal directly with the chief executive or
appropriate agency manager on matters and, if they remain dissatisfied
with a reply, they may raise the issue with the minister. It is for the minis-
ter to decide who should represent him/her at Parliamentary Select Com-
mittees when the affairs of the agency are being discussed—in practice,
this is normally the chief executive (Department of Health and Social
Services (NI) 1991).
Like government agencies throughout the United Kingdom, however,
important questions have been raised over the respective roles of
ministers and chief executives, creating opportunities to scapegoat
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responsibility for policy failures and abdicate control of the agencies. This
has been described as the “bureaucratic Bermuda Triangle” in which
accountability disappears (Treasury and Civil Service Committee 1994,
para. 166, quoted in Butcher 1995). The best known example in Great Brit-
ain occurred in October 1995 when the Director General of the Prison Ser-
vice (Derek Lewis) was dismissed by the Home Secretary. A damning
report (Learmont) on the management of prisons, following the escape of
three dangerous prisoners from Parkhurst jail, led the minister to call for
the director’s resignation. The director refused on the grounds that there
had been policy u-turns and ministerial interference in the day-to-day
running of the service. As one commentator noted:
This distinction between policy and operations sounds neat but is unconvincing.
Executive agencies were supposed to produce clearer more open lines of respon-
sibility, but it is impossible to separate the policy decisions of ministers from the
operational decisions of chief executives. . . . Chief Executives can be sure that
their ministerial masters will ultimately be willing to sacrifice them in the over-
riding cause of political self-preservation (Riddell 1995, 6).
Adopting a British model of public administration, with its inherent prob-
lems of accountability in the Northern Ireland context, therefore exacer-
bates problems associated with the “democratic deficit.”
Boards and Trusts
A sub-strata of boards and trusts operate under the aegis of central gov-
ernment departments. The creation of internal market arrangements
which separate the assessment of need and purchasing of services from
their delivery has spawned additional bureaucracies. The provision of
health care, which accounts for 20% of public expenditure in the Province,
is typical. Four health and social services boards, as agents of the Depart-
ment of Health and Social Services, commission and purchase health and
social care for their resident populations from a range of providers—
health and social services trusts, voluntary and private sectors. General
practitioners’ (GPs) practices can also opt to be fundholder units with
their own budgets to purchase a defined range of hospital and community
services from providers. A total of 20 health and social services trusts have
been established since the internal market came into operation in April
1992.
Two key problems of accountability arise from this system of service
delivery in Northern Ireland. First, in the reorganization of the four health
and social services boards, local elected councillor representation disap-
peared and 16 district health and social services committees, representative
of public and consumer interests, were replaced by an advisory structure
of four area health and social services councils, bodies with a consultative
role and limited clout. All non-executive board appointments, their chair-
men and members of advisory councils are by government appointment,
or in the gift of the minister. The second problem of accountability arises
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from appointments to the health and social services trusts. Here too, the
chairmen and members are government appointees, although the system
provides the somewhat dubious concession that any member of the public
can make their interest known to the DHSS or health trust to be considered
for appointment. The official position is that all appointments are made on
the basis of merit and there are no formal criteria for appointment. In prac-
tice, however, research on the appointment system to boards in Northern
Ireland has concluded that there are:
no stringent guidelines concerning who can be appointed and how they must be
approached. There are no stipulated criteria for selection and no formal inter-
viewing process. Ministers and senior civil servants therefore have considerable
freedom in the selection process. . . . An examination of the membership lists of
public bodies highlights the fact that each department in the civil service has its
own “players” and these people are consistently reappointed to sit on public
bodies (Gray and Heenan 1995, 66–67).
The Labour Government has made a commitment to abolish the internal
market for health and social services, including the GP fundholding
scheme, and to replace it with new arrangements for commissioning and
delivery of health and social services.
Quangos
Aside from the central machinery of government, and to add to its admin-
istrative mosaic, Northern Ireland has its share of quangos or quasi-
autonomous non-governmental organizations. Quangos cover a variety of
bodies (usually referred to as Non-Departmental Public Bodies—NDPBs),
exercising executive, advisory and tribunal functions. In Northern Ireland
this includes bodies as diverse as the police authority for Northern Ire-
land, education and library boards, health and social services boards, the
local enterprise development unit, the Northern Ireland housing execu-
tive, the Labour relations agency and the transport holding company.
Some of the larger executive quangos undertake functions performed by
local authorities in Great Britain. The proper and effective operation of
quangos is all the more important because of the absence, up until now, of
a tier of regional government in Northern Ireland. Government data for
1997–8 show that there are 44 executive non-departmental public bodies
and 32 national health service bodies in Northern Ireland with an expen-
diture of £4,707m (over 50% of the total public sector purse) (Department
of Finance and Personnel and HM Treasury 1998). The cabinet office pub-
lication “Public Bodies” lists a total of 148 bodies (executive, advisory
NDPBs and tribunals) operating in Northern Ireland, accounting for more
than 2,000 public appointments.
Quangos are not a Northern Ireland-specific phenomenon and their
increase UK-wide has been the subject of a comprehensive review (Demo-
cratic Audit 1994) which exposed the extent of their growth and criticized
their lack of accountability.
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In area after area of public life, elected government is being replaced by appoint-
ive government. Those who are elected count for ever less; those who are
appointed count for ever more. This hastily erected apparatus of appointive
government lacks the essential democratic underpinnings of scrutiny, openness
and accountability, but is now responsible for nearly a third of central govern-
ment spending (Weir 1995, 320–321).
Northern Ireland, however, is the worst case scenario in which quangos
continue to evolve on the back of an administrative system dogged by
problems of electoral accountability. Research carried out by the Northern
Ireland Council for Voluntary Action (NICVA) on quangos which relate
to community and voluntary groups, revealed a stark absence of mecha-
nisms for access or accountability. NICVA concluded that in Northern Ire-
land, where traditional accountability for service provision was largely
absent, “this context could be seen by quangocrats as a challenge to devise
new processes” . . . instead it “has offered an excuse, at best, for avoiding
the issue of accountability” (Bradley 1994, 26). Until then, the growth of
quangos had received little attention. The editor of a local newspaper
(Ulster Newsletter) described their lack of scrutiny as a result of the press
preoccupation with coverage of “the troubles:”
The Direct Rule government of Northern Ireland involves unelected quangos
running everything from health to education and the police. They are not used
to a probing press. There will be a lot of squealing pigs as vested interests are
investigated. While everyone has been talking about turning swords into
ploughshares, we in the press need to be turning ploughshares into swords
(Halon 1995, 23).
Concerns have been expressed about both the operation of quangos and
the appointments process. These concerns tend to focus on the overall
number of quangos, the scope for improvements in their efficiency and
financial management and whether their functions are necessary, or could
be performed differently; but there are also concerns about the procedures
by which members are appointed to quango boards. In short, the concen-
tration has been on how quangos function on a day-to-day basis and how
they could be made more open and accountable. In November 1997 the
Labour Government issued a Consultation Paper Opening Up Quangos as a
UK-wide document for public discussion, but its salience in Northern Ire-
land was paramount given the problems of accountability and loss of dem-
ocratic control associated with Direct Rule. Suggestions for improvement
arising from the consultation (Quangos: Opening the Doors—June 1998)
include encouraging non-departmental public bodies to offer greater
access to information by publishing annual reports, publicizing reports of
meetings and, where possible, making meetings more accessible to the
public. The scope of registers of members’ interest is being extended, as are
codes of ethics for staff and members. Other measures include expanding
the proposed Freedom of Information Act to include NDPBs and a wider
remit for the Commissioner for Public Appointments.
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Local Government
Local government in Northern Ireland has perhaps been the greatest casu-
alty of direct rule arrangements. Councils’ record of discrimination in
appointments, gerrymandering and unfair methods of housing allocation
played a large part in the civil strife of the late 1960s (Darby 1976; Whyte
1983). This culminated in a reform process dictated by Westminster (the
Macrory Report) which created a single tier of 26 district councils to dis-
charge largely prosaic functions.
Since its reform in 1973 local government plays a minor role in public
service provision. The 26 single-tier authorities are limited chiefly to the
delivery of minor regulatory services. Local councils have three main
roles: an executive role in which they provide certain regulatory services
(e.g. building regulations, environmental health, licensing of dance halls,
cinemas) and the provision of a limited range of functions such as street
cleaning, refuse collection, cemeteries and crematoria, recreation and
tourist amenities and economic development; a representative role where
members are nominated to serve on area boards (e.g., education and
library boards); and a consultative role where councils’ views are sought on
centrally provided services such as planning, roads, water and housing.
These seemingly innocuous roles have attracted a degree of criticism. The
absence of major functional responsibilities, combined with no regional
tier of government, turned council chambers into a forum for occasional
vitriolic and sectarian debate on constitutional and security issues well
beyond their remit. By the same token, there is some doubt about the cali-
ber of councillor attracted to a relatively powerless body. From the coun-
cils’ perspective, there is growing unease that their representative role is
being eroded (e.g., removal of councillors from health boards) under
restructuring of central services. An ongoing problem is that government
departments and agencies, responsible for providing central services in
council areas, treat consultation as a token gesture at best, or a derisory
intervention by councillors with narrow parochial interests, at worst.
This emasculated form of local government is illustrated by consider-
ing its location within the overall public administration system of
Northern Ireland. Estimated net spending by councils in 1997–8, for exam-
ple, amounted to £230m out of a Northern Ireland public expenditure
budget of £8.5 billion, approximately 2.7% (Department of the Environ-
ment 1998). Yet local authorities are important for other reasons. First,
whatever emerges from the fledgling assembly, a future restructuring of
the various tiers of government is inevitable and will involve a reassess-
ment of the role of councils. Second, in the long absence of any devolved
government arrangements (and until the new assembly takes root), coun-
cillors continue to be the most accessible source for constituents with
concerns about centrally provided services (housing, planning and social
security in particular). Third, councils employ about 9,000 people in a
region noted for its high level of unemployment.
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Local authorities have witnessed both a period of political turmoil and,
more recently, cross-community accommodation. In 1985 the election of
Sinn Féin members to council chambers caused outrage amongst the
Unionist parties and led directly to a policy of obstruction—isolating their
councillors by excluding them from speaking (Connolly and Knox 1986).
These tactics were legally challenged and found to be unlawful by the
High Court. The Anglo-Irish Agreement of November 1985 ushered in a
new wave of protest fought at the local government level. Unionist-
controlled councils adopted a policy of adjourning councils meetings and
refusing to strike rates. They argued that to administer local government
was to give tacit support to the London–Dublin partnership (Connolly
and Knox 1988). Government eventually had to step in with commission-
ers to maintain essential services. The protest campaign withered away to
an inauspicious end. The local government elections of 1989 marked a
turning point in council chambers with a degree of moderation not unre-
lated to a decline in representation from the political extremes. From this
more stable political context an experiment in “responsibility sharing”
developed (this term evolved in deference to Unionist sensitivities over
the words “power sharing”). Eleven local authorities appointed may-
ors/chairs and deputies from both political traditions. This trend has con-
tinued and following the 1997 local government elections, Belfast’s first
nationalist Lord Mayor was appointed in its 150-year history.
Partnerships
Local authorities have become pivotal brokers in partnership arrange-
ments designed to deliver European funded service programs. In 1995, the
European Union (EU) launched the Special Support Program for Peace
and Reconciliation, a 300 MECU (£215m) package designed to reinforce
progress towards a peaceful and stable society following the cease-fires.
District partnerships, representing each council area, and comprising
equal numbers from local councillors, community/voluntary representa-
tives, and business/trade-union/statutory sectors, approve action plans
for local activities to advance the objectives of the program. The process
aims to achieve peace and reconciliation by broadening participation
through socially inclusive programs in employment, productive invest-
ment and urban/rural regeneration. The district partnership concept is
analogous to a “greenfield site” offering a new development in widening
the basis of participation in decision-making throughout the 26 district
council areas. Partnerships are “uncontaminated” by past associations
with any national government, or with any particular tradition within the
Province, all of which undoubtedly accounted for the enthusiastic recep-
tion they have generated across the political spectrum.
After some initial problems associated in particular with fears around
usurping the role of elected bodies and representatives, local authorities
have demonstrated a readiness to both enter partnerships and make them
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succeed. The ideological baggage which participants brought to the pro-
cess was left outside meetings. In part, too, however, the willingness to
entertain “responsibility sharing” has extended to a predisposition to
involve as many in the community as possible in decision-making. This
has had the effect of not only including socially excluded groups but also
those (in business and professional occupations, and in charitable and vol-
untary organizations) detached from local politics, disillusioned and
repelled by ugly scenes of sectarianism in a small number of councils, as
well as the apparent futility of debate in fora which are perceived as essen-
tially redundant. Clearly, although their budgets and influence are mar-
ginal to the totality of public expenditure (£40m over 3 years set against
£8.5bn annually), district partnerships meet the requirements for agree-
ment, consent and acceptance by both communities. In that sense, the
level of spending is almost incidental—what is important is the process of
changing attitudes, creating social inclusion and capacity building. Part-
nerships have therefore harnessed the emerging goodwill in local authori-
ties, mobilized an apathetic business sector into taking ownership of
social goals and energized the voluntary sector which has played a vital
role in community development throughout the “troubles.”
This overview of the public administration system in Northern Ireland
would suggest that the political problems which led to direct rule from
Westminster have implanted an unaccountable framework within which
major public services are delivered. Set alongside this, the UK govern-
ment’s program of public service reform which included privatization,
competitive tendering, agentization and the creation of internal markets,
has compounded the “democratic deficit” and conspired to produce a sys-
tem of public administration in Northern Ireland which has simply
adopted major reform initiatives without reference to the political context.
The result of both these factors is complacency and inertia among senior
civil servants under direct rule arrangements. We now consider the struc-
ture established under the new Northern Ireland Assembly and the policy
issues of major concern confronting local politicians.
THE NEW NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY
The new 108-member Assembly was elected by PR (STV) on 25 June 1998
under the terms of the Good Friday Agreement to “exercise full legislative
and executive authority in respect of those matters currently within the
responsibility of the six Northern Ireland Government departments, with
the possibility of taking on responsibility for other matters” (Strand 1—
The Agreement: para 3:5).2 Executive authority will be discharged on
behalf of the Assembly by a First Minister (David Trimble, UUP) and
Deputy First Minister (Seamus Mallon, SDLP) and up to 10 ministers
(shared on a proportional basis) with departmental responsibilities. The
Assembly will operate in “shadow form” until the main implementing
legislation has been enacted and brought into effect. When this occurs
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direct rule will end. The Secretary of State, Dr. Mowlam, described this as
a new era in Northern Ireland politics:
Northern Ireland has shown that it wants this Agreement to work and has
elected representatives who are committed to making it work starting with the
Assembly. Those representatives now look towards taking control of the reins of
government in Northern Ireland. A whole generation of politicians has missed
out on a chance to exercise real power (Northern Ireland Information Service: 27
June 1998).
Aside from the Assembly and Executive, the new institutions of govern-
ment include:
• a north-south ministerial council bringing together those with execu-
tive authority, north and south, to work together by agreement on
matters of mutual interest. Those participating on the council will be
mandated by, and remain accountable to, the Assembly and the Irish
Parliament. At least six “implementation bodies” will be identified to
put decisions by the council into effect on a cross-border or all-island
basis in specified areas (e.g. agriculture, tourism, waterways, envi-
ronment);
• a British-Irish council to bring together British and Irish government
representatives of devolved administration in Northern Ireland,
Scotland and Wales and from the Channel Islands and the Isle of
Man. The Council aims to “promote the harmonious and mutually
beneficial development of the totality of relationships amongst the
people of these islands” (Strand 3: The Agreement para 1:14);
• a new British-Irish intergovernmental conference to deal with all bi-
lateral issues between the two governments, involving the Secretary
of State and relevant executive members of the Northern Ireland Ad-
ministration, to discuss non-devolved issues which arise in relation
to Northern Ireland;
• an independent consultative forum, appointed by the two adminis-
trations, representative of civil society, comprising the social partners
and other members with expertise in social, cultural, economic and
other issues.
Set alongside the new governance structure a series of politically sensitive
policy issues are being pursued under the terms of the Agreement to cre-
ate a “normal and peaceful society in Northern Ireland” (Secretary of
State’s statement to the House of Commons: 20 April 1998).
The most important are:
Prisoners
An accelerated program for the release of prisoners will be implemented
through a new Sentence Review Body which will consider on a case-by-case
basis, their eligibility. Those prisoners who belong to organizations which
have not declared and are not maintaining unequivocal cease-fires will not be
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considered for release. Prisoners who qualify will be released on license and
returned to prison if they engage in any further terrorist activity. As a political
counterbalance, a Victims’ Commission reported (“We Will Remember Them:”
Sir Ken Bloomfield Report April 1998) on ways to “recognise the pain and suffer-
ing felt by victims of violence arising from the troubles of the last 30 years,
including those who have died or been injured in the service of the community”
(p 6).
Decommissioning
Both the British and Irish governments have taken steps to facilitate the decom-
missioning process through a decommissioning scheme in Northern Ireland and
regulations in the Republic. Participants in the agreement committed them-
selves to a total disarmament of all paramilitary organizations by working with
the independent international body on decommissioning. The objective is to
achieve either the provision of information to the commission leading to the col-
lection and destruction of arms and/or the destruction of arms by persons in
possession of them by May 2000.
Policing and Criminal Justice
Parallel reviews of the policing service and criminal justice systems have been
established. The former is an independent commission (chaired by Chris Patten,
ex-governor of Hong Kong and minister in Northern Ireland) set up to consider
what kind of policing service would be appropriate in Northern Ireland devoid
of terrorist violence. The latter is a government-led review, with external asses-
sors, which will address the structure, management and resourcing of the crimi-
nal justice system to include appointments to the judiciary, the prosecution
service and the possibility of a separate department of justice.
Human Rights and Equality
A new independent Human Rights Commission is envisaged to consult and
advise on the scope for defining rights supplementary to those in the European
Convention on Human Rights which the British government is in the process of
incorporating into United Kingdom law. There will also be a statutory require-
ment on the public sector to promote equality of opportunity and the creation of
a unified equality commission embracing existing statutory bodies (fair employ-
ment commission; the equal opportunities commission; the commission for
racial equality; the disability council).
THE FUTURE: AN AGENDA FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM
A number of issues arise from this overview of direct rule arrangements
and the transitional phase to devolved government. First, the current
system of public administration in Northern Ireland is patently unsatis-
factory. Direct rule from Westminster since 1972 has become an excuse for
administrative intransigence. The assumption that no changes can be
made to public service delivery in the absence of progress on the constitu-
tional front has created and embedded a plethora of boards, trusts,
quangos and civil service departments characterized by administrative
indifference. The key power brokers are senior civil servants whose
departmental responsibilities go largely unchecked by Westminster poli-
ticians consumed by political/constitutional and security matters.
Second, the Good Friday agreement seeks to address the excesses of
direct rule by vesting greater democratic accountability in a devolved
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government. In implementing the agreement the British government is
tackling the most contentious policy issues central to an enduring political
settlement (political prisoners, arms decommissioning, policing and crim-
inal justice). Third, cognizant of the potential for the abuse of power and
mindful of the bitter legacy of discrimination and sectarianism, safe-
guards will be included (e.g. decision-taking on the basis of “sufficient
consensus”) or strengthened through a human rights commission and
effective equality legislation.
While laudable in themselves and not to undervalue the significance of
achievements made thus far, this is only the beginning of a much more
fundamental root and branch review needed of governance arrangements
in Northern Ireland. A serious cultural adjustment will be necessary for
politicians and officials alike. It has been too easy for politicians to indulge
in Northern Ireland office-bashing in the guise of the secretary of state.
Devolved government will mean “power with responsibility” and some
difficult decisions await incoming Assembly ministers (particularly in the
areas of budget restrictions in health and education). Similarly, senior civil
servants, weaned on a diet which granted autocratic status, must come to
terms with local accountability, in some cases to political masters whose
political views they find anathema. As one former senior official
described it:
Those civil servants faced with a genuine crisis of conscience at being asked to
work for an Assembly member with, perhaps, a terrorist background may have
to find their own way of declining (Andy Woods: “Aunt Sally shies away from it
all” Sunday Times, 28 June 1998:20).
Alongside this cultural shift in the political/administrative axis, the
Assembly will need to give serious consideration to the following:
• There is a real need to assess the role of local authorities, the only en-
during democratic forum throughout the period of direct rule, yet
limited in their functional responsibilities. This will necessarily in-
clude a review of the plethora of government agencies, boards and
trusts who provide services undertaken by local government in Great
Britain. Moreover, central—local government relations have, not sur-
prisingly, plummeted over time as a direct result of arrogant civil ser-
vants (planners in particular) ignoring local council input to the
decision-making process.
• A major overhaul of the burgeoning quango state is imperative. It is
unacceptable under devolved arrangements to have 50% of public
expenditure controlled by non-departmental public bodies in the
charge of appointees. While the rationale for establishing such bodies
was often to remove their functions from government (fair employ-
ment, housing, police) for express political reasons, current devolved
government (with safeguards) should obviate the need for a large
number of quangos.
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• Investment in the partnership model. One of the success stories, as a
by-product of attempts to achieve peace and reconciliation under the
European Special Support Programme is the acknowledged value of
the social partnership model of service provision. The Secretary of
State in a speech to the European Parliament (29 April 1998) express-
ing gratitude for its help towards the achievement of the Good Friday
Agreement, singled out district partnerships as “a fresh approach to
funding projects, bringing together people from all walks of life
(elected councillors, the voluntary and community sector, statutory
agencies, business and trade unions) with outstanding benefits above
and beyond the impact of the projects themselves.” While some
expression for this model has been given in the proposed civic or con-
sultative forum to be set up under the terms of the agreement, there
needs to be a wholesale endorsement of the principle of social part-
nership in Northern Ireland. This, in effect, would not only provide a
more pluralistic form of policymaking but act as an additional safe-
guard on politicians reverting to sectarian-type.
• Collaboration with the voluntary/community sector. Throughout
the period of direct rule government and in the absence of a stable so-
ciety, the voluntary/community sector filled the vacuum through ca-
pacity- building, community engagement and service delivery. In
1975 some 500 community groups and associations were in existence
(Birrell and Murie 1980) while more recently the Northern Council
for Voluntary Action has estimated the current combined total of vol-
untary organizations, community groups and charitable bodies at
5,500. Their interests are wide-ranging and embrace planning, advo-
cacy, service delivery and job creation in a manner which is comple-
mentary to the work of public bodies and the private sector. This
enduring commitment to the principles of community development
established the sector as a pivotal player in building a better future
which is targeted at promoting economic development, social inclu-
sion and reconciliation. The new devolved government should
capitalize on the obvious strengths contained within the voluntary/
community sector.
Northern Ireland is at the crossroads of a major political and admin-
istrative reform program. It now has the foundations for a long-term
constitutional settlement, although still fragile and subject to events which
could jeopardize its survival (marches, dissident terrorist groups, punish-
ment beatings and shootings). The new Assembly has the opportunity to
overhaul an inappropriate system of governance characterized by a high
level of centralization and low level of accountability. Changes to the
public administration system in parallel with new constitutional arrange-
ments now present local politicians with the opportunity to stabilize a
society riven with violence for 30 years.
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Notes
1. The six central government departments are: agriculture, economic devel-
opment, environment, education, health and social services, finance and
personnel. The Northern Ireland Office has responsibility for political and
constitutional issues, security policy, prisons, criminal justice and police
matters.
2. The Assembly elections results were as follows:
Seats: UUP = 28; SDLP = 24; DUP = 20; Sinn Fein = 18; Alliance = 6; UKU = 5;
PUP = 2; Others = 6.
Percentage first preference vote: UUP = 21.26; SDLP = 21.96; DUP 18.13;
Sinn Féin = 17.63; Alliance = 6.5; UKU = 4.51; PUP = 2.55; Others = 7.46.
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